The paper analysis the strategies and concepts developed in the world in modern directions: innova- tive economy, digital economy, artificial intelligence, Industry 4.0 and others. The problem is to determine the initial fundamental parameters of order and their prospects in the global world, the definition and principles of artificial intel- ligence systems, its structure and important aspects and principles of future science and technology in analysis and synthesis based on synergetic approaches, innovative, information, converged technologies, taking into account the design (...) of future and viable and safe and sustainable development in the context of Industry 4.0, digital economy and Society 5.0. The general scheme of the integrated model of sustainable and socio-humanitarian development in the global system is proposed, which the authors call the noosphere model of sustainable and safe development as an important fundamental platform for the design and creation of AIS. In the XXI century education, science and innova- tive technologies becomes the «basis» of the spiritual and material reproduction of man, transforming the society of the XXI century into an educational society, ensures compliance with the law of advanced development of human quality, quality of social intelligence and quality of educational systems in society. noosphere evolution. Industry 4.0 is the next stage in the digitalization of production technologies with the accelerated introduction of new developments and cyberphysical systems, which is changing business models. Accordingly, Industry 4.0 as a separate segment of digital manufacturing technologies takes its place among other digital sectors. The analysis of the Strategies and Concepts developed in the world in modern directions: innovative economy, digital economy, artificial intelli- gence, Industry 4.0 and others is carried out in the work. The problem is to determine the initial fundamental para- meters of order and their prospects in the global world, the definition and principles of artificial intelligence systems, its structure and important aspects and principles of future science and technology in analysis and synthesis ba- sed on synergetic approaches, innovative, information, converged technologies, taking into account the design of future and viable and safe and sustainable development in the context of Industry 4.0, DE and Society 5.0. The main scientific and technological factors in the 21st century will be the development of: Artificial Intelligence, Nano Technologies, Bio-Media Technologies, Cognitive Technologies and Socio-Humanitarian Technologies. More specifically – this is the modern development of Innovative Technologies: «NBIC SH». Therefore, it is necessary to note the importance of taking into account the principle of I2K2+SH, ie: Intellectualization, Integration, Convergence, Coevolution and Socio- humanitarian technologies. It is important and necessary to take into account modern principles of designing a su- stainable and secure AIS and solving the problem of Harmonization between 2 worlds: Real and Virtual, especially in their hybridization. Our immediate future is a hybrid nonlinear world. Note that digitalization, artificial intelligence and robotics will be the main drivers of global economic growth by 2030E. An important paradigm and platform is the Integrated System: for Industry 4.0, DE and AI, taking into account the complex principle of I2K2+SH. If the transition of the Ukrainian economy to an innovative one does not take place in the next 3-5 years, Ukraine will remain in the backyard of civilization. (shrink)

New trends in the economic systems management in the context of modern global challenges: collective monograph / scientific edited by M. Bezpartochnyi, in 2 Vol. // VUZF University of Finance, Business and Entrepreneurship. – Sofia: VUZF Publishing House “St. Grigorii Bogoslov”, 2020. – Vol. 1. – 309 p.

The main purpose of legal interpretation is to create conditions for the effective functioning of law and its components by clarifying their true content, which eliminates any doubts and ambiguities. The purpose of this article is: first, to analyze the provisions of current Ukrainian legislation for identifying the general approaches embodied in it and the principles for the implementation of legal interpretation activities by state power bodies; secondly: presentation on the basis of modern achievements and developments of legal science of (...) the system of measures for standardization of such activity, bringing it in line with the needs of law enforcement practice. The solution of the set tasks was carried out using the method of philosophical dialectics, a system of general scientific and special scientific methods of cognition, which are based on the principles of objectivity, comprehensiveness, complexity. Based on the analysis of the normative material, it is concluded that there is no single harmonized approach in the Ukrainian legislation on the procedure for providing clarifications of the content of normative-legal acts. The authors give arguments on the need to clarify and streamline the legal interpretation activity by state bodies and propose a number of measures to achieve this goal. Based on the conducted analysis of the normative material, the authors outline the main problematic issues of the legislative definition of the basics of legal interpretation and provide specific proposals for improving the current legislation in this area. (shrink)

The subject of this article is the concept of natural liberation in classical Sāṃkhya. On the basis of the Sāṃkhyakārikā by Īśvarakṛṣṇa and its traditional commentaries, I will attempt to demonstrate that liberation from suffering in Sāṃkhya is not the result of rational inquiry—the prevailing view among contemporary scholars. The Sāṃkhya does not necessarily prescribe yogic practice as argued by other scholars. Instead, I will defend a position expressed by K.C. Bhattacharyya and Frank R. Podgorski, according to which liberation in (...) classical Sāṃkhya is a natural and spontaneous process of suffering transforming into its own cure. I will argue that although traditional authorities may disagree over the form the liberating process takes on the phenomenal level, there is a general agreement that the natural forces are the primary drives and agents of liberation. (shrink)

Sometimes it is practically beneficial to believe what is epistemically unwarranted. Philosophers have taken these cases to raise the question are there practical reasons for belief? Evidentialists argue that there cannot be any such reasons. Putative practical reasons for belief are not reasons for belief, but reasons to manage our beliefs in a particular way. Pragmatists are not convinced. They accept that some reasons for belief are practical. The debate, it is widely thought, is at an impasse. But this debate (...) fails to address what is puzzling and interesting about the cases. By focusing on reasons for belief, the debate completely overlooks the role of action in relation to belief. We should be talking about the reasons for actions that shape our beliefs, which I will call belief management. I argue for three related theses: the interesting cases that motivate the debate are about belief management; Evidentialism is irrelevant to belief management; agents have practical reasons to manage their beliefs with the aim of forming true beliefs. These reasons are categorical in nature and result in the tension of conflict cases. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for a conditional parity thesis: if we are agents with respect to our intentions, we are agents with respect to our beliefs. In the final section, I motivate a categorical version of the parity thesis: we are agents with respect to belief and intention. My aim in this paper is to show that there is no unique challenge facing epistemic agency that is not also facing agency with respect to intention. My thesis is ambitious on (...) two fronts. First, the parity thesis is a substantive thesis about the nature of belief and intention. I argue that there is a structural parity of belief and intention; the status of whether they are agential stands and falls together. Second, the parity thesis illuminates the nature of agency. It constrains what counts as a satisfactory account of agency: either we must accept agency of both belief and intention, or we must reject both. In the final section, I argue that we have prima facie reason to accept agency of belief and intention. Finally, I diagnose why there has been such resistance to epistemic agency. Epistemic agency is problematic, but its problems are problems with agency, not problems with epistemic agency. (shrink)

Cotton examines Plato 's ideas about education and learning, with a particular focus on the experiences a learner must go through in approaching philosophical understanding.

Traditionally the domain of scientists, the history of science became an independent field of inquiry only in the twentieth century and mostly after the Second World War. This process of emancipation was accompanied by a historiographical departure from previous, 'scientistic' practices, a transformation often attributed to influences from sociology, philosophy and history. Similarly, the liberal humanists who controlled the Cambridge History of Science Committee after 1945 emphasized that their contribution lay in the special expertise they, as trained historians, brought to (...) the venture. However, the scientists who had founded the Committee in the 1930s had already advocated a sophisticated contextual approach: innovation in the history of science thus clearly came also from within the ranks of scientists who practised in the field. Moreover, unlike their scientist predecessors on the Cambridge Committee, the liberal humanists supported a positivistic protocol that has since been criticized for its failure to properly contextualize early modern science. Lastly, while celebrating the rise of modern science as an international achievement, the liberal humanists also emphasized the peculiar Englishness of the phenomenon. In this respect, too, their outlook had much in common with the practices from which they attempted to distance their project. (shrink)

Constructivist approaches in epistemology and ethics offer a promising account of normativity. But constructivism faces a powerful Schmagency Objection, raised by David Enoch. While Enoch’s objection has been widely discussed in the context of practical norms, no one has yet explored how the Schmagency Objection might undermine epistemic constructivism. In this paper, I rectify that gap. First, I develop the objection against a prominent form of epistemic constructivism, Belief Constitutivism. Belief Constitutivism is susceptible to a Schmagency Objection, I argue, because (...) it locates the source of normativity in the belief rather than the agent. In the final section, I propose a version of epistemic constructivism that locates epistemic normativity as constitutive of agency. I argue that this version has the resources to respond to the Schmagency Objection. (shrink)

An ethics of imitation risks trivializing, aggrandizing, and homogenizing the company of disciples. Should followers of Jesus even try to walk this way?

The central focus of this paper is to motivate and explore the question, when is it permissible to endorse a psychologizing explanation of a sincere interlocutor? I am interested in the moral question of when (if ever) we may permissibly dismiss the sincere reasons given to us by others, and instead endorse an alternative explanation of their beliefs and actions. I argue that there is a significant risk of wronging the other person, and so we should only psychologize when we (...) are in a position to know that they are in bad faith. (shrink)

Recent work has argued that there may be cases where no attitude – including withholding – is rationally permissible. In this paper, I consider two such epistemic dilemmas, John Turri’s Dilemma from Testimony and David Alexander’s Dilemma from Doubt. Turri presents a case where one’s only evidence rules out withholding (without warranting belief or disbelief). Alexander presents a case where higher order doubt means one must withhold judgment over whether withholding judgment is rational. In both cases, the authors conclude that (...) no doxastic attitude is warranted. In this paper, I argue against the possibility of these epistemic dilemmas. I argue that withholding cannot be irrational in either case. But meditating on the dilemmas gives us an important – and overlooked – insight into the nature of rational withholding. First, rational withholding is a function of evidence failing to sufficiently support belief or disbelief. As a result, withholding is not symmetrical to belief and disbelief. Second, there can be two distinct grounds for rational withholding. First, propositional withholding, which arises when our evidence does not support belief or disbelief in p. And second, doxastic withholding, which arises when we cannot determine whether our evidence supports belief or disbelief in p. Accepting two grounds of rational withholding licenses a kind of Weak Permissivism. But this Weak Permissivism should not be troubling to anyone. (shrink)